Marine corps small wars manual

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Audio Software icon An illustration of a 3. Software Images icon An illustration of two photographs. Images Donate icon An illustration of a heart shape Donate Ellipses icon An illustration of text ellipses. Small wars manual Item Preview. EMBED for wordpress. Want more? Advanced embedding details, examples, and help! Publication date Topics United States. Russell collection: 1. Organization : The estimate of the situation ; The staff in small wars ; Composition of the force -- 3. Logistics : Introduction ; Supply ; Transportation -- 4.

Training : Character and purpose of small wars training ; Training during concentration ; Training en route on board ship ; Training in the theater of operations ; Training programs and schedules -- 5. Initial operations : Neutral zones ; Movement inland ; Military territorial organization ; Methods of pacification -- 6.

Infantry patrols : Small war tactics ; Orders and general instructions ; Organizing the infantry patrol ; Feeding the personnel ; The march ; Reconnaissance and security ; Laying ambushes ; Attacking ambushes ; Attacking houses and small bivouacs ; Strategems and ruses ; River crossings ; Special operations -- 7. The military strategy of small wars is more directly associated with the political strategy of the campaign than is the case in major operations… In small wars, either diplomacy has not been exhausted or the party that opposes the settlement of the political question cannot be reached diplomatically.

Small war situations are usually a phase of, or an operation taking place concurrently with, diplomatic effort. That this joint action remains a feature of counterinsurgency operations today suggests the timeless aspect of this observation born in the jungles of Central America and the Philippines.

Strategy is just the beginning of the intuitional learning demonstrated by the Small Wars Manual. Staffing and pre-deployment preparation also get a detailed review. An overarching theme, one that is not surprising to those familiar with Clausewitz and Western military thinking, is that all activities from the most simple to the most complex are in support of achieving the political aim of the conflict.

This is vital since units are so widely disbursed across often challenging terrain. It also features information gathered on the political, economic, social, and psychological aspects of the country in which fighting will occur and centralizes other information relevant to situational awareness at the start of operations.

In its discussions relating to intelligence operations during small wars, the Manual shows off some of its best examples of learning from past experiences.

It starts from a realistic premise — many locals will oppose the intervening force even if the force views its cause as just and helpful; consequently, intelligence available to the insurgents will be especially good.

The Manual entreats its readers to pay these individuals low wages and only give bonuses after the provision of valuable information. The alternative, voluntary informants, receives little appreciation. Material from these sources is viewed as unreliable since it often arrives too late, is distorted, or is just patently false. On an important related matter, the Manual makes clear the position of the U.

In no minced words, it argues:. Methods of extracting information which are not countenanced by the laws of war and the customs of humanity cannot be tolerated. Such actions tend to produce only false information and are degrading to the person inflicting them. Finally, the Manual lauds the importance of propaganda. It suggests that people most respond to last impressions, frequent messages among many, and repeated messages in sequence.

In the most general sense, when the document uses the term, it is referring to the origins of individual dispositions in either the counterinsurgent or insurgent. It is of primary importance that the fullest benefit be derived from the psychological aspects of the situation.

That implies a serious study of the people, their racial, political, religious, and mental development. By analysis and study the reasons for the existing emergency may be deduced; the most practical method of solving the problem is to understand the possible approaches thereto and the repercussion to be expected from any actions which may be contemplated. The insistence on getting quality local information is well founded and supported throughout the Manual.

For instance, there is significant discussion about how to deal with local populations, specifically how information will flow from informal networks and how to gather information from individuals without offending local sensibilities, including guidance about how to accept gifts from locals while not giving the impression of special treatment.

The implications of the policy and strategy outlined in the earliest portions of the Small Wars Manual flows naturally to its operational and tactical portions.

These chapters actually make up the bulk of the Manual though most of their information falls outside the bounds of this introductory paper. Still, those affecting strategy or policy are worth considering. By exploring these in the order they might occur during a small war helps draw out their connections and larger implications.

Should a crushing defeat of opposing forces during the initial entry into the country not pacify the population, forces engaged in the intervention should prepare to continue fighting guerillas.

Forces might spread out through towns and establish fixed posts from which to operate with the aim of occupying area. A closer looks at patrols of various types and their cousins, flying columns, are most illustrative of institutional learning. The Manual details what should constitute a combat patrol, including lists of materials, menus for food, and instructions on how to march in addition to guidelines for building lean-tos and laying ambushes, among other topics.

Most important, however, are its entreaties for the principles of mass, or appropriately sized forces, movement, that is rapidly moving forces, surprise, and security as keys to successful patrols. While many of the same principles of patrols apply to flying columns, there are some special considerations that derive from these units operating on their own for such extended periods time.

For example, the Manual strongly suggests that flying columns should always have significant cash in their possession not just for the purchase of supplies, but also for the purchase of intelligence from among the people it is likely to spend so much time around.

A host of other lessons learned are applicable to patrols and columns of any kind. In an example of a very detailed suggestion, the Manual discusses mosquito netting. While it is helpful in malarial conditions, the Marines caveat this common sense by sharing that past units had not carried the bulky material in tropical environments and suffered no harmful consequences.

It implores readers to remain on the offensive and avoid remaining garrisoned without patrols spread throughout the country. So, where does this ranging review of the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual leave the modern student of strategy and diplomacy? This essay attempts to lay out just how the Manual is an example of institutional learning and captured many of the lessons the American military learned from its decades of fighting insurgencies throughout the Americas and parts of Asia during the early 20 th century.

But there are limitations. A modern reader of the Manual quickly sees its out of date understanding of American military organization and technology. Many of its suggestions are overly detailed for contemporary audiences, soldier or scholar, or have been simply overtaken with time. Likewise, its understanding of how small wars might evolve in the modern context misses, for obvious reasons, important developments of the past several decades.

Sadly, these areas are where the bulk of its pages are spent. Meanwhile, its insights into timeless tactics like ambushes remain valid, but these are captured in many other military documents that are used in training solders today. In this way the Manual has become more a historical document than anything else.

In the end, the most relevant pages of the Small Wars Manual are found its first chapter. Here the nature of small wars is defined. Here are the central insights surrounding linked military action and diplomatic activity during small wars.

Here are the beginnings of the need to understand the local culture and support the security of the local people. Anything after that serves only to refine, highlight, or provide historical context.

These numbers take two forms, one stamped at the upper right or left corner of each page and a second consistently printed at the bottom of the page in the middle.

These numbers often do not match since the stamps refer to subsections and not pages themselves. For the sake of consistency, this paper cites pages using the bottom number listed on each page. Because these reset with each new chapter, citations list both the chapter and the page, where the first number in the citation before the hyphen is the chapter and the second number is the page, e.

Return to text. Given controversies following the apparent use of torture by American intelligence operatives following the September 11 th attacks, this clear stance on the issue rings as especially relevant not just to the time of its writing, but also today. That this is the conclusion of a document resting its authority on decades of counterinsurgency experiences gives the message a practical strength that augments the readily apparent moral condemnation of torture.

Bickel, Keith B. Indeed, his work is the best for understanding the context and the authors that helped give rise to the Manual. Boot, Max. By reviewing instances of American involvement in small wars from throughout the 19 th and 20 th centuries, Boot highlights just how long the United States has been fighting and learning from these wars.

He devotes an entire chapter to the Small Wars Manual that is especially useful in putting it into context. Caldwell, C. Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice. A bit dated at points, it remains a classic for understanding the development of small war or counterinsurgency thinking.

Indeed, many of the key concepts and terms used by later writers are rooted in those coined by Caldwell. The Small Wars Manual captures many of the timeless strategic and tactical aspects of fighting insurgencies and remains especially valuable today as a historical document capturing how the U.

Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Westport, CT: Praeger, This may be the seminal work on counterinsurgency published in the 20 th century, and Galula is a required reading for both scholars and practitioners alike. Born of his experiences in fighting insurgencies in Asia and North Africa, this book captures many of the most widely accepted tenants of counterinsurgency in just one hundred pages.